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Abstract. The standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas production predicts a 
monotonically declining saving rate, when reasonably calibrated. Ample empirical evidence, 
however, shows that the transition path of a country’s saving rate exhibits a rising or non-
monotonic pattern. In important cases, hyperbolic discounting, which is empirically strongly 
supported, implies transitional dynamics of the saving rate that accords well with empirical 
evidence. This holds true even in a growth model with Cobb-Douglas production technology. 
We also identify those cases in which hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent to 
exponential discounting. In those cases, hyperbolic discounting does not affect the saving rate 
dynamics. Numerical simulations employing a generalized class of hyperbolic discounting 
functions that we term regular discounting functions support the results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper considers the question of whether or not hyperbolic discounting adds enough 
flexibility to an otherwise standard growth model for the saving rate to exhibit non-monotonic 
dynamics. It is well known that the standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas 
technology and isoelastic preferences – one of the most frequently used frameworks in 
macroeconomics – exhibits a monotone transition path of the saving rate. For a reasonable 
calibration, it exhibits a monotonously declining transition path as an economy develops. This 
property, however, is counterfactual. As discussed in Section 2, ample empirical evidence 
suggests two regularities: an increase in the saving rate as an economy experiences growth of 
per capita income; a non-monotone transition path, typically featuring a hump.  
 
The standard growth model’s counterfactual prediction of a monotone declining transitional 
path of the saving rate is unappealing. Often, analyses of the effects of tax shocks are 
concerned with effects on transitional paths. Or to think of another example, the analysis of 
development policy typically focuses on transitional dynamics. Therefore, a growth 
framework should be flexible enough to allow for a non-monotonic saving rate dynamics. 
 
The problem of the standard growth model’s counterfactual prediction of transitional 
dynamics has been addressed in the literature. Gómez (2008), among others, provides a 
solution by allowing for a more flexible CES technology. In this paper, we provide a different 
solution in that we allow preferences to exhibit hyperbolic discounting. Both approaches add 
enough flexibility to the otherwise standard growth model for the saving rate to exhibit non-
monotonic dynamics. 
 
In the standard neoclassical growth model, preferences are independent of time. Empirically, 
however, there is abundant evidence for the pure rate of time preference to decline over time, 
i.e., for hyperbolic discounting (cf., e.g., Ainslie 1992, and Laibson 1997). Discount rates are 
time sensitive, exhibiting a “present bias”: people tend to put especially high weight on a 
given gain/loss delayed in the near future as opposed to the same gain/loss delayed in the 
more distant future. In this paper, we investigate the effects of hyperbolic discounting on 
transitional paths of the saving rate in three frameworks. The first one is a “standard” 
framework in which sophisticated households fully commit to their initial intertemporal 
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consumption plans in spite of hyperbolic discounting. In the second framework, along the 
lines of Caliendo and Aadland (2007) as well as Findley and Caliendo (2011), naïve 
households, who are not aware of their future impatience, are revising their initial 
intertemporal consumption plans at every instant in time. In the third framework, we 
reconsider Barro’s (1999) Cournot-Nash equilibrium without commitment. Employing these 
frameworks, our analysis gives rise to the following results.  
 
First, in most cases, hyperbolic discounting adds enough flexibility to the otherwise standard 
growth model (with Cobb-Douglas technology) for the saving rate to exhibit non-monotonic 
dynamics. In some cases, however, hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent to 
exponential discounting, so that the saving rate dynamics is monotone. Second, observational 
equivalence occurs in two cases: in the framework with naïve households when utility is log-
linear and the discounting function belongs to the class of regular discounting functions (see 
below); in the Cournot-Nash framework when utility is log-linear and the rate of interest is 
constant over time. Third, we introduce the class of regular discounting functions. This class 
captures cases in which the second order growth rate of the discount rate is a constant 
multiple of the first-order growth rate. Most discounting specifications employed in the prior 
literature are special cases of the regular discount function, notably exponential discounting 
(i.e., the discount rate is constant), less-than-exponential discounting, classical hyperbolic 
discounting (Ainslie 1992), or zero discounting. 
 
This paper is related to several previous studies on saving rate dynamics. Gómez (2008) and 
Smetters (2003) introduce a CES production technology with elasticities of substitution 
differing from one. They show that a CES between capital and labor below (above) unity 
might imply a hump shaped (inverse-hump shaped) transitional path of the saving rate. 
Gómez (2008) provides a more general analysis than Smetters (2003) in the presence of CES 
technology. Litina and Palivos (2010) introduce endogenous technical progress. Both Gómez 
(2008) and Litina and Palivos (2010) show conditions under which there is overshooting 
(undershooting) behavior of the transition paths of the saving rate. Antràs (2001) shows that 
the introduction of a minimum consumption level (Stone-Geary preferences) may also imply 
a hump shaped savings profile. In his model, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) 
rises over time, which first weakens the substitution effect and later on, the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect, thereby generating a hump shaped transitional path. He also 
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provides econometric evidence in support of the non-monotonic transitional path of the saving 
rate both in OECD countries and in a larger cross-section of countries.  
 
The previous literature demonstrates that the saving rate may exhibit a non-monotonic 
transition path in a neoclassical growth model with CES technology. In our paper, we 
maintain Cobb-Douglas technology. However, in contrast to the prior literature, we allow 
preferences to exhibit hyperbolic discounting. We contribute to the existing literature by 
showing that the introduction of hyperbolic discounting is an alternative explanation for an 
increasing or non-monotonic transition path of the saving rate. The main mechanism works 
via the Euler equation. Hyperbolic discounting adds a discounting effect to the substitution 
and income effects. As the pure rate of time preference declines over time, the difference 
between the rate of interest and the rate of time preference increases which, ceteris paribus, 
raises the return on savings. Unless observational equivalence occurs, the discount rate effect 
gives rise to an increasing saving rate or to non-monotonic dynamics of the saving rate – even 
with Cobb-Douglas production technology.  
 
Section 2 provides empirical evidence supporting two stylized facts: as an economy grows, its 
saving rate tends to rise; the transitional path of a country’s saving rate behaves non-
monotonically over time. In addition, Section 2 briefly discusses the theoretical argument 
behind the non-monotonic dynamics of the saving rate in the presence of a discounting effect. 
Section 3 presents the benchmark model with hyperbolic discounting under full commitment. 
Transitional paths of the saving-rate are shown to be non-monotonic, even in the case of 
logarithmic utility. In addition, we introduce a generalized class of hyperbolic discounting 
functions that we term regular discounting functions. In Section 4, we focus on a model with 
naïve consumers having a short planning horizon – in the absence of commitment. We also 
briefly review Barro’s (1999) Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In both frameworks the saving rate 
may exhibit non-monotonic transition paths, but we also identify cases in which hyperbolic 
discounting is observationally equivalent to exponential discounting. Section 5 concludes, and 
the Appendix contains a number of derivations and proofs of propositions.  
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2. Empirical evidence of the behavior of the saving rate, and the theoretical argument 
 
2.1 Empirical evidence 
 
Data on gross national saving rates suggest two regularities: as a country develops, its saving 
rate tends to increase, at least over some range; and, over time, saving rates may behave non-
monotonically (hump-shaped). Neither of these regularities can be explained by a (reasonably 
calibrated) standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas production, as shown by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p.135 ff.). 
 
Stylized Fact 1. As a country develops, its saving rate tends to increase.  
 
Maddison (1992) provides evidence for 11 countries whose savings account for about half of 
world savings. He finds that over the last hundred-twenty years, the saving rates of all but one 
country (U.S.A.) increased substantially over time. Table 1, which is based on Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004), provides empirical evidence for national saving rates. 
 
Table 1. Gross national saving rates (percent) 
Period Australia Canada France India Japan Korea U.K. U.S.A. 
1870-89 11.2 9.1 12.8 - - - 13.9 19.1 
1890-09 12.2 11.5 14.9 - 12.0 - 13.1 18.4 
1910-29 13.6 16.0 - 6.4 17.1 2.4 9.6 18.9 
1930-49 13.0 15.6 - 7.7 19.8 - 4.8 14.1 
1950-69 24.0 22.3 22.8 12.2 32.1 5.9 17.7 19.6 
1970-89 22.9 22.1 23.4 19.4 33.7 26.2 19.4 18.5 
Source: Barro, Sala-i-Martin (2004, p.15) 
 
In all countries, except for the United States, present saving rates are significantly above their 
levels in late nineteenth century. Similar evidence is seen in East Asia for the last half 
century. With the exception of the Philippines, gross national saving rates have increased in 
the Asian “Tiger-countries” over the last fifty years, as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Gross national saving rates in East Asian countries (percent) 
Period Hong Kong Taipei Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines 
1960’s 31  14  8  25   22  7  17 
1970’s 32  27  35  29   26  19  21 
1980’s 34 31  42  33   26  33  20 
1993 37  28  50  41   35  34  14 
Source: Leipziger and Thomas (1997) 
 
Along the same lines, Loayza et al. (2000) show for 98 countries that private saving rates rise 
with the level of real per capita income. We now turn to: 
 
Stylized Fact 2. The transitional path of a country’s saving rate behaves non-monotonically. 
For most countries, the respective transitional path exhibits a marked hump. 
 
That the gross saving rates are lower in the eighties than earlier is a well documented 
regularity (cf. Shafer et al. 1992). Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1999) as well as Antràs (2001) 
demonstrate that for most of 24 OECD countries, as well as for the OECD as a whole, the 
transitional paths of the saving rates exhibit a hump when considering the last half century. 
Maddison (1992) shows that in many countries, after World War II, the saving rate exhibits 
overshooting. Similar trends are reported by Bosworth et al. (1991), Christiano (1989), Chari 
et al. (1996), and Tease et al. (1991). 
 
Below, we show that when preferences exhibit hyperbolic discounting, a neoclassical growth 
model with Cobb-Douglas technology is, in many cases, consistent with those stylized facts. 
 
2.2 The theoretical argument, in brief 
 
As a country develops, the real rate of interest declines, giving rise to both a substitution and 
an income effect. As the return on saving declines, ceteris paribus households tend to lower 
the saving rate over time,  (substitution effect). On the other hand, the desire for 
consumption smoothing requires a household in an economy distant from the steady state to 
consume more relative to actual income. As the economy develops, however, consumption 
relative to income declines. As a consequence, this income effect tends to raise the saving rate 
0s <?
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over time, . In general, these two effects may give rise to a complicated dynamics of the 
saving rate. With Cobb-Douglas production, however, it has been demonstrated by Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004) that the dynamics of the saving rate is always monotonic – a 
counterfactual prediction, as shown in Section 2.  
0s >?
 
The consideration of hyperbolic discounting in the standard framework adds a third effect that 
we term discounting effect. Over time, as the pure rate of time preference declines, the 
difference between the rate of interest and the rate of time preference increases, ceteris 
paribus. This causes the “return on savings” to increase, which lowers the substitution effect 
and tends to increase the saving rate. Taking the discounting effect into account, in addition to 
the substitution and income effects, may give rise to an increasing saving rate or to non-
monotonic dynamics of the saving rate – even with Cobb-Douglas production technology.  
 
This argument, while reasonable, holds true only in the absence of observational equivalence. 
In some cases, as analyzed below, a growth model with hyperbolic discounting is 
observationally equivalent to the corresponding standard growth model with a constant rate of 
time preference. That is, for every pattern of the hyperbolic discount function, there exists a 
constant rate of time preference that gives rise to exactly the same transitional dynamics of 
the saving rate (and those of the other variables of the model). In these cases, hyperbolic 
discounting does not affect the saving rate dynamics – specifically, hyperbolic discounting 
does not imply a non-monotonic saving rate dynamics. 
 
 
3. The neoclassical growth model with hyperbolic discounting 
 
We modify the standard neoclassical growth model in that we allow the pure rate of time 
preference to depend on time. Time is considered a continuous variable in our model.2 The 
most prominent example of a time-dependent rate of time preference occurs with hyperbolic 
discounting. Psychologists and behavioral economists argue that an individual discounts the 
near future at a greater rate than the distant future (cf. Ainslie 1992 or Laibson 1997). We 
argue below that, in the presence of commitment technologies, the resulting model is not 
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2 For simplicity of notation, we let subscript  denote time. t
observationally equivalent to the standard neoclassical growth model (see also Gong et al., 
2007). In the subsequent section, we extend the analysis to a framework without commitment. 
 
3.1 The benchmark model  
 
3.1.1 Production 
 
Let the aggregate production function be 
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1< <
0
 , (1) 1( ) , 0t t t tY K A L
α α α−=
where  is (date t-) output,  labor input,  capital input, and  an index of labor-
augmenting productivity that evolves through exogenous disembodied technical change: 
tY tL tK tA
 ,ttA e
γ γ= ≥ . (2) 
We consider a closed economy so that national income accounting implies 
 t tY C It= + , (3) 
where  is aggregate consumption. The capital stock develops according to  tC
 , 0t t t tK Y C Kδ δ= − − >? , (4) 
where δ  is the rate of depreciation of capital.  
 
We now embed the described technology into a market economy with perfect competition. 
The representative firm chooses inputs so as to maximize the profit for a given real wage, , 
and capital rental rate, 
tw
tR . Given equilibrium in the factor markets, the rental rate must satisfy 
/t t tR Y Kα= , and the following no-arbitrage condition holds: t tr R δ= − , where  is the rate 
of return on the market for loans. 
tr
 
The dynamics of the production sector is best described by the ratios of output to capital and 
consumption to capital. We denote the transformed variables by /t tz Y Kt≡  and /t t tx C K≡
g
.3 
In the following, dating of variables is suppressed unless when needed for clarity. Let  y
                                                 
3 The transformation of variables allows for expressing the dynamic system as well as the phase diagrams in the 
Appendix in a simple way: growth rates become linear functions of ( , )x z . However, we continue to work with 
untransformed variables in the further frameworks below.  
denote the growth rate of some variable y . Then the capital accumulation equation becomes 
Kg z x δ= − − . Furthermore, the growth rate of output equals (1 )( )Y Kg g nα α γ= + − +
)( )n
, with 
 being the population growth rate. Combining both growth expressions, the dynamics of 
the production sector is given by 
0n ≥
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 ( 1)( ) (1z Y Kg g g z xα δ α= − = − − − + − γ + . (5) 
 
3.1.2 A representative household 
 
nteThe representative household has tL =  members, each inelastically supplying one unit of 
labor per unit of time. We allow the pure rate of time preference, tρ , to depend on time. 
Function  has the following properties. At 0t = , 0ρtρ = ρ . Following the literature on 
hyperbolic discounting, we allow tρ  to decline over time: 0tρ ≤? , and limt tρ ρ→∞ = , where 
 represents a lower bound on the instantaneous discount rate. Specifically, 0ρ ≥ tρ ρ ρ≥≥ . 
We define a household’s discount factor by 0
t
D e
− sdsρ
t
∫≡ , implying that the absolute 
instantaneous rate of time preference at date t is given by ttρ = −
t
D
D
?
. 
 
A household’s preferences are described by an instantaneous CRRA utility function with 
absolute elasticity of marginal utility of consumption equal to θ . Facing given market prices 
and equipped with perfect foresight the sophisticated household chooses a consumption plan 
 so as to  { } 0t tc ∞=
{ }
0
1
0
0
s.t. ,
t
s
t
r d
c
K
∞
= +
∫
∫
0
1max
1
given,
lim 0,
t
t
t tc
t t t t t t
s
t t
U L D dt
K r w L c L K
K e
θ
θ
−
−
→∞
−= −
−
≥
?  
where  is per capita consumption, and the inequality is the No-Ponzi-Game condition. To 
ensure boundedness of the utility integral, we impose the following parameter restriction: 
tc
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n (1 ) lim (1 ) 0.t tnθ γ ρ θ γ→∞− + − = − + − <ρ  (6) 
 
Define the Hamiltonian by 
 
 
1
( , , , ) ( )
1
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
cH c K t L D r K w L c L
θ
μ μθ
−
= + + −− . 
 
Households are impatient but not shortsighted. They are aware of the fact that they are more 
impatient in the near than in the distant future (sophisticated households). In this section, 
households are considered to be able to fully commit to their optimal consumption plans over 
time. Below, we discuss commitment and analyze different frameworks without commitment. 
An interior solution satisfies the Keynes-Ramsey rule, 
 t t t t
t
c r z
c
tρ α δ ρ
θ θ
− − −= =?  (7) 
 
and the transversality condition 0lim 0
t
sr ds
t tK e
−
→∞
∫ = .  
 
3.1.3 Dynamics of the economy  
 
Notice that x cg g n g= + − K . We can therefore describe the dynamics of the economy by two 
differential equations in the endogenous variables x  and z : 
 
 
[ ]
1 ( ) (
( 1)( ) (1 )( )
t t t t t
t t t
) t
t
x z z x
z z x
α δ ρ δθ
α δ α γ
⎡ ⎤= − − − − − −⎢⎣
= − − − + − +
?
?
n x
n z
⎥⎦ , (8) 
 
where tx  is a jump variable, and  is a predetermined variable. tz
 
Figure 1 shows the 0x =?
x?
- and  lines in  space. The decline of the instantaneous 
discount rate makes the  line shift downwards over time. The figure also shows a steady 
state. A (non-trivial) steady state (SS) of the system is a point , with both coordinates 
0z =? ( , )z x
0=
* *( , )z x
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=strictly positive, such that , where an asterisk marks steady state values 
of variables. If parameter restriction 
* * * *( , ) ( , ) 0x z x z z x=? ?
( )
(6) holds, there exists a nontrivial steady state with: 
 
 * *, , (z x nδ γθ ρ δ γθ ρ )γ δα α
+ + + +⎛= −⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞+ + ⎟ . (9) 
 
 
Figure 1. - and  lines in  space, 0x =? 0z =? ( , )z x 0 1t t t∞< <  
 
In Figure 1, points A and B do not represent steady state equilibria. As the  line shifts 
over time (and becomes stationary only asymptotically), the dynamical system exhibits an 
asymptotic steady state, SS, which is a saddle point and is saddle point stable by the fact that 
0x =?
1α < .4 Figure 1 also shows that, both tx  and  decline along the transition paths, as a 
growing economy develops. 
tz
 
3.2. Behavior of the saving rate under commitment 
 
At date t, the (gross) saving rate equals 1 /t ts x tz= − . As an economy develops, whether the 
saving rate increases or decreases (possibly non-monotonically) along the transition path 
depends on whether  declines by more or by less than tz tx .
5 Generally, the behavior of the 
saving rate is complicated along the transition path as a substitution effect opposes an income 
                                                 
4 The determinant of the Jacobian of the dynamical system at the steady state equals * *(1 ) / 0x zα α θ− − < . 
5 Due to strict concavity of the production function, as tK  increases, /t t tz Y K=  decreases. 
effect. As an economy develops,  declines and so does the rate of interest. This substitution 
effect lowers the return on savings and tends to lower the saving rate. At the same time, as  
declines, the difference between current and permanent income decreases. That is, relative to 
income, consumption declines. This income effect tends to raise the saving rate.  
tz
tz
 
For a model with Cobb-Douglas production and without hyperbolic discounting ( tρ ρ= ), it is 
well known that, as an economy develops, the saving rate monotonically decreases (increases) 
if  (if ) (Barro, Sala-i-Martin 2004, p.135 ff.). For a 
reasonable calibration,
1 * *1 /s xθ − > = − *z *z1 *s< =
17
*1 /xθ − −
6 if θ <  – which is considered plausible7 – the saving rate 
monotonically declines as an economy develops. This implication, however, is counterfactual 
in the sense that more developed economies often exhibit a higher saving rate than less 
developed economies, as shown in Section 2. 
 
Moreover, the discounting effect opposes the substitution effect, giving rise to non-monotonic 
behavior of the saving rate.  
 
Proposition 1. Consider the neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas production and 
exponential discounting ( 0tρ =? ). Then the transition path of the saving rate is monotone.  
In the case of hyperbolic discounting ( 0tρ <? ) with full commitment, however, the transition 
path of the saving rate can also exhibit non-monotone transition paths. Specifically, along the 
transition path, the saving rate may overshoot or undershoot towards its steady state level.  
 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
 
As shown in Appendix A, the sign of  depends on the sign of ts?
( ) / ( ) (t t n )ψ δ ρ γθ αθ γ≡ + + − + δ+ . Specifically,  
 
 sgn sgn( )ts tψ= −? . (10) 
 
                                                 
6 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) suggest 0.3, 0.02, 0.05, 0.02, 0.01.nα γ δ ρ= = = = = . 
7 Hall (1988) favors a value of 5θ = . 
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Notice that / ( )t tψ ρ αθ=? ? . Consider the case of exponential discounting: / ( ) 0t tψ ρ αθ= =? ? . 
In this case, the sign of tψ  does not change over time, and the saving rate is either 
monotonically decreasing or monotonically increasing over time. 
 
In case of hyperbolic discounting, / ( ) 0t tψ ρ αθ= <? ? , several possibilities emerge. First, 0ρ ≥  
is large enough so that tψ  is positive for all t. In this case, the saving rate monotonically 
declines, as was the case without hyperbolic discounting.8  
 
Second, 0tψ >  initially (for large 0ρ ), and 0tψ <  as time proceeds and tρ declines. In this 
case, the saving rate initially declines but then increases towards its steady state level (see 
Appendix A, Figure A1). Intuitively, while the lower interest rate provides the household with 
an incentive to reduce its saving rate, this incentive is outweighed by a larger incentive to save 
as the pure time preference rate declines, thus resulting in a higher saving rate ceteris paribus. 
Thus, households reduce savings by less as compared to the situation with a constant discount 
rate. Over time, the weight of the substitution effect declines, and the income effect takes 
over, eventually. At this point, the saving rate starts to increase towards its steady state value. 
 
Third, if the stable arm, in a phase diagram, shifts downward over time, but still has a positive 
slope in steady state, the saving rate first increases but starts to decrease as of a specific date 
(see Appendix A, Figure A2).  
 
In this framework, hyperbolic discounting is never observationally equivalent to exponential 
discounting. That is, given a hyperbolic discount function, there does not exist a constant rate 
of time preference that gives rise to exactly the same transitional dynamics of the saving rate. 
To see this, we employ standard methods to derive per capita consumption.9 To simplify the 
exposition, we assume 0nγ = = , 1tL = , 1θ = . Let 0( ,0)
t
sR t r≡ ds∫ . Then, per capita 
consumption becomes: 
 
                                                 
8 Similarly, if oρ  is so small that tψ  is negative from the beginning, the saving rate monotonically rises over 
time. This possibility, however, requires an unrealistically high value of θ . 
9 See Appendix B for a similar derivation. 
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( ,0) ( ,0)
0 0
0
R R t
t
k w e d e
c
D d
τ
τ
τ
τ
τ
∞ −
∞
⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= ∫ ∫ tD . (11) 
 
The denominator of (11) equals some constant in both cases, exponential- and hyperbolic 
discounting. Observational equivalence requires the factor  in case of exponential 
discounting to equal a constant (
tD
ζ ) times the discount factor in case of hyperbolic 
discounting for all : 0t ≥
 0 ,
t
s dste e t
ρρ ζ −− ∫ 0= ≥ . (12) 
 
Requirement (12), however, is satisfied if and only if tρ ρ=  for all .0t ≥ 10 That is, under 
hyperbolic discounting, when tρ  declines over time, the condition for observational 
equivalence, (12), is never satisfied. As a consequence, the saving rate may exhibit non-
monotonic transition paths. 
 
Observe that the results of Proposition 1 presume that the representative agent has access to 
commitment technologies and fully commits to his decisions. In Section 4 below, we discuss 
the significance of this assumption, and we consider a framework without commitment.  
 
3.3 Regular discounting 
 
In the following, we specify a rather general class of discounting functions that encompasses 
many special cases employed in the previous literature. Following the concepts employed by 
Groth et al. (2010), we call this class the class of regular discounting functions. 
 
The first-order growth rate of the discount factor is given by / 0D t t tg D D ρ= = − <?
/ /
. The 
second-order growth rate of the discount factor is given by 2,D D D t tg g g ρ ρ= = ?? . Following 
Groth et al. (2010), we call discount functions regular, if  
                                                 
10 Take the natural logarithm on both sides: 
0
ln
t
st dsρ ρ ζ− + =∫ = constant. Taking the derivative with respect 
to time yields: tρ ρ= . 
14 
 
 15 
 
0 2, ,D Dg gβ β= ≥ , (13) 
 
where the constant β  is called the dampening coefficient. Given 0 1D =  and 0 0ρ ρ= > , the 
second order differential equation (13) has the unique solution 
 1/(1 ) ,
1t t
D t
t
β ρρβ ρ ρβ
−= + = + . (14) 
The regular discount functions (14) encompass a number of special cases, depending on the 
specific value of the dampening parameter. First, if 0β = , tρ ρ= . This is the case of 
conventional exponential discounting. Second, if 0β > , the discount rate declines in t. This is 
the case of hyperbolic discounting. If 1β = , 1(1tD )ρt −= + . This is the case of classical 
hyperbolic discounting.11 As the dampening parameter rises, the rate of decline of the 
discount rate becomes larger, and as the dampening parameter approaches infinity, the 
discount rate declines to zero instantly. Table 3 summarizes regular discount functions. 
 
Table 3. Regular discount functions 
     β   tρ     tD
Regular discounting (general)   ( )/ 1 tρ ρβ+   1/(1 )t βρβ −+  
Exponential discounting  0β =   ρ    te ρ−  
Classical hyperbolic discounting 1β =   ( )/ 1 tρ ρ+   ( )1/ 1 tρ+  
No-discounting   β →∞  0        1 
 
 
Figure 2 shows time paths of the discount rate for various values of the dampening 
coefficient. The figure illustrates that regular discount functions capture the whole spectrum 
                                                 
11 In the original, classical psychological literature, hyperbolic discount functions like 1/  or t 1(1 )tρ −+  were 
used (Ainslie, 1992). 
of discount functions between exponential discounting, less-than-exponential (that is, 
hyperbolic) discounting, and no discounting at all.12 
 
 
Figure 2. Time paths of the discount rate with 0 0.03ρ ρ= = . 
 
With regular discounting, the growth rate of the saving rate becomes: 
 
 ( ) ( )/ 1(1 ) ts t t z tg z x n α δ ρ ρβα δ α γ α θ
− − += − − + − − − . (15) 
 
With this notation at hand, we are now prepared to study numerical simulations for transition 
paths of the saving rate.13 
 
3.4 Numerical simulations of the saving rate for regular discounting functions 
 
To assess the impact of hyperbolic discounting on the transition path of savings, we consider 
an adverse shock on the predetermined state variable z. At time zero, starting from an initial 
                                                 
12 If 0β > ,  for regular discounting functions. For the more general framework discussed above, 
the limit, denoted by 
lim 0t tρ→∞ =
ρ , was allowed to take on a positive value as well. 
13 Regular discounting satisfies Farzin’s (2006) condition for Weitzman’s “stationary equivalence” property to 
hold (cf. Farzin 2006, p.528). Thus, there exists a permanently sustaining constant consumption (utility) path. 
This does not, however, imply observational equivalence, as discussed for (11) above. 
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steady state, we increase the value of the predetermined variable, , by 50%.z 14 The resulting 
time paths show the non-linearized transitions of the saving rate (and other variables of 
interest) from far away from the steady state to the steady state equilibrium. These transition 
paths are interpreted as showing the development of the saving rate (and other variables) as a 
country develops, i.e., as its stock of capital increases (z decreases).15   
 
Table 4. Baseline values of background parameters 
Preference parameters 0.03ρ = , 3θ =   
Production parameters 0.3α = , 0.02γ = , 0.05δ =  
Population growth   0.01n =
Note. The time unit is one year; the dampening coefficient, β , varies across simulations. 
 
Figure 3, presents transition paths of the saving rates for the baseline values of background 
parameters and for various values of β . The calculations of the transition paths are based on 
the Relaxation Algorithm (Trimborn et al., 2008). 
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14 With 0.3α = , this shock corresponds to a decline in the capital stock by 71%. As the capital stock increases, z 
decreases because of the concavity of the production function.  
15 We employ the Mathematica implementation of the Relaxation Algorithm (Trimborn et al., 2008) to produce 
the numerical results documented in this paper. The code is available from the authors upon request. Notice that 
the shock is introduced on the state variable, not on a specific parameter. All parameters take on the same values 
before and after the shock. That is, the shock is introduced only to allow the Relaxation Algorithm to calculate 
transition paths. 
17 
 
Figure 3. Time paths of the saving rates with different values of the dampening factor. 
 
The steady state value of the saving rate depends on the value of the dampening factor. If 
0β = , limt tρ ρ→∞ = , and the associated steady state saving rate is denoted by *s ( 0 , 
however, 
.17)= . If
0β > im, l 0t tρ→∞ = ,
**s ( 0.22)
 and the associated (higher) level of the steady state saving 
rate is denoted by = . The baseline value of the elasticity of marginal utility is 3θ = . 
Hence, with exponential discounting ( 0tβ ρ= =? ), the saving rate monotonically decreases 
along the transition path towards .  *s
 
With hyperbolic discounting, however, transitional paths exhibit a non-monotonic pattern. 
Whether the saving rate over- or undershoots depends on the value of the dampening 
coefficient. Intuitively, if the dampening coefficient is “low,” the rate of interest declines at a 
higher rate than the discount rate. In this case, the optimal consumption growth rate, as given 
by (7), declines over time. That is, the household shifts consumption from the future to the 
present, thereby lowering the saving rate initially. Over time however, as the consumption 
growth rate declines, the saving rate increases towards its steady state level. In contrast, if the 
dampening coefficient is “high,” the rate of discount declines at a higher rate than the interest 
rate, i.e., the optimal consumption growth rate, rises over time, and the household shifts 
consumption from the present to the future. So, initially, the saving rate is increased. Over 
time however, as the consumption growth rate rises, the saving rate decreases towards its 
steady state level. 
 
The key feature of this model with full commitment – allowing for nonmonotonic saving 
behavior – consists in the fact that the (effective) discount rate, tρ , declines over time. As 
discussed below, this feature may also occur in frameworks without commitment. 
 
Two more points are worth emphasizing. First, hyperbolic (regular) discounting generally 
implies a non-monotonic transition path of the saving rate, as observed empirically. Second, 
with a “low” value of the dampening coefficient, the saving rate increases over (most of the) 
time as per capita income grows. This is true for realistic parameter values, as given in Table 
2 (specifically 3θ = ). However, with a “high” value of the dampening coefficient, the saving 
rate exhibits a hump, as is consistent with Stylized Fact 2.  
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 Corollary 1. Consider the neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas production and 
logarithmic utility with hyperbolic discounting ( 0tρ <? ) under full commitment. The saving 
rate regularly exhibits non-monotonic transition paths.  
 
It is important to emphasize that the result of non-monotonic transition paths of the saving 
rate is not due to the fact that 3θ = . As long as the representative agent commits to her 
decisions, non-monotonicity of the transitional paths of savings is also present for a log-linear 
utility function. Figure 3A displays the transitional paths of the saving rate – parallel to those 
of Figure 3 – but with 1θ =  rather than 3θ = . 
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Figure 3A. Time paths of the saving rate with different values of the dampening factor under 
log-linear utility. 
 
4. Behavior of the saving rate under hyperbolic discounting without commitment 
 
In the previous section, households are assumed to commit to their decisions. Partial or full 
commitment is a more convincing case than one is inclined to think at first consideration. 
There is an abundance of commitment technologies. These include all illiquid assets. "All of 
the illiquid assets … have the same property as the goose that laid golden eggs. The asset 
promises to generate substantial benefits in the long run, but these benefits are difficult, if not 
impossible, to realize immediately." (Laibson 1997, p.445) Specific illiquid assets include 
retirement plans, or assets that are associated with a steady stream of benefits but are hard to 
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sell, like houses. As emphasized by Laibson (1997, p.445), in the FED publication Balance 
Sheets for the U.S. Economy 1945-1995, two thirds of domestic household assets are 
considered illiquid – not even taking into account social security wealth or human capital. 
 
Notwithstanding these arguments, we consider the case of no commitment in the following. 
The proceeding sections are concerned, respectively, with sequential planning of households 
with short planning horizons, and with Cournot-Nash equilibria, both in the absence of 
commitment. 
 
4.1 No commitment and short-term planning 
 
In the previous section, we argue that in a model with hyperbolic discounting and full 
commitment, it is the time-dependency of the discount rate that yields non-monotonic saving 
paths. In the prior literature, it is argued that under hyperbolic discounting – in the absence of 
commitment – one ends up with a constant effective discount rate so that the model is 
observationally equivalent to the respective model without hyperbolic discounting (Findley 
and Caliendo 2011). Here, we argue that this, while quite possible, is for the most part not the 
case. 
 
In this subsection, we consider a framework with a naïve household who is not aware of its 
time-inconsistent preferences, that is, of its future impatience. The household, endowed with a 
short planning horizon, , re-optimizes at all , thereby altering its original (time-h 0t t> 0t t= ) 
intertemporal consumption plan. Will we still encounter non-monotonic transition paths of the 
saving rate? The answer depends on whether or not the discounting function is regular and 
utility is log-linear. As shown by Findley and Caliendo (2011), short-term planning perfectly 
offsets hyperbolic discounting in case of log-linear utility.  
 
In the following, the exponential discount function is characterized by16 
 
                                                 
16 In the previous section, we denoted the discount factor by 0 s
ds
D e
τ ρ
τ
−∫= . Here we generalize this notation to 
allow for any initial t : ( , )D tτ . 
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 sρ ρ= , ( )( , ) t ds tD t e e
τ ρ ρ ττ − − −∫= =  , 1( , )
ht h
t
eD t d
ρ
τ τ ρ
−+ −=∫ , (16) 
 
while regular hyperbolic discount functions are characterized by 
 
 
[ ] 1/
( 1 )/
, ( , ) 1 ( )
1 ( )
1 (1 )( , ) .
( 1 )
st
ds
s
t h
t
D t e t
s t
hD t d
τ ρ
,β
β β
ρρ τ βρρ β
β ρτ τ β ρ
− −
− ++
∫= = = ++ −
− + += − +∫
τ −
  (17) 
 
( , )D tτ  represents the discount factor at date τ  as seen from date t .   
 
Every household only plans for some period of finite length, h, and we allow a household to 
re-optimize at every date t. The procedure applied follows Caliendo and Aadland (2007), and 
Findley and Caliendo (2011). In order to simplify notation, we consider 0n γ= = .  
 
At every point t , a household solves a short-horizon (fixed-endpoint) control problem: 
 
 
{ }
0
0
0
0
1
0 0 0
0 0
1max ( , ) , [ , ]
1
s.t. , given, [ , ]
0.
t h
c
t
t
t h
c D t d t t h
k r k w c k t t h
k
τ
θ
τ
τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τθ
τ
+ −
+
− ∈ +−
= + − ∈ +
=
∫
?  (18) 
 
In (18), 0( , )D tτ  is a general discounting function, where discounting is pursued from the 
viewpoint of . The solution to 0t (18) is planned consumption from the perspective of . The 
(fixed-endpoint) terminal condition 
0t
0
0t hk + =  indicates that the household is concerned only 
with the “next” h periods. It does not imply that wealth (capital) is actually equal to zero at 
, as the household’s planning horizon is continuously sliding forward. As the planning 
horizon is sliding forward, previous consumption plans are invalidated, and the household re-
optimizes and updates its consumption plan at every t. That is, although a household plans to 
0t h+
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exhaust its resources within h periods, it never actually exhausts its resources in finite time, as 
it keeps re-planning its consumption plans.17  
 
As demonstrated in the Appendix, application of the Maximum principle to (18) yields 
 
 
0
( , )
1 1 ( , )
,
( , )
, given .
t h R t
t t
t
R tt h
t
t t t t t t
k w e d
c
D t e d
k r k w c k
τ
τ
θ τθ θ
τ
τ τ
+ −
−+
+=
= + −
∫
∫
?
  (19) 
 
Equation (19) presents optimal consumption of a short-sighted household with hyperbolic 
discounting, as captured by the denominator. In (19),  is derived as the envelope of 
infinitely many initial values from a continuum of planned time paths (cf. Appendix). 
tc
 
The important insight from (19) consists in the fact that the denominator accounts for the 
propensity to consume out of total wealth. The denominator, however, does not necessarily 
depend on the shape of the discounting function. Consider 1θ = . Then, the propensity to 
consume depends on the integral, that is, on the area below the discounting function. In other 
words, if the integrals of different discounting functions – for example an exponential- and a 
hyperbolic discounting function – yield the same values then these discounting functions are 
observationally equivalent.  
 
Proposition 2. Consider a naïve household with a short planning horizon, , and with 
logarithmic utility, 
h ++∈?
1θ = . Then, every framework with regular hyperbolic discounting, under 
( , | )D tτ ρ , is observationally equivalent to a corresponding framework with exponential 
discounting, under ( ,E t | )τ ρ , for some [ ]max0,ρ ρ∈ , where ρ ρ< . As a consequence, the 
saving rate follows a monotone transition path in spite of hyperbolic discounting. 
 
                                                 
17 Suppose the discount rate is constant in time. Then, only in case h approaches infinity, the transversality 
condition induces the household to pick the optimal consumption path. As h approaches infinity, the short-term 
planning model approaches the neoclassical standard model. Once h is finite, however, the short-term 
consumption plans differ from the standard optimal neoclassical consumption plan. 
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Proof.  Let ( , | )E tτ ρ  denote the exponential discount function, and let ( , | )D tτ ρ  be the 
regular hyperbolic discount function with 0β > . The upper bound maxρ  is implicitly defined 
by max( , ( , | )
t h t h
E t d|1)
t t
D t dτ τ τ ρ+ τ+ =∫ ∫ . Figure 4 provides intuition for the proof that is 
analytically given in the Appendix. || 
 
The idea of the proof is depicted in Figure 4. For 0ρ = , . 
For 
( , ) ( , )
t h t h
t t
D t d E t d hτ τ τ τ+ += =∫ ∫
(0,1]ρ ∈  and 0β > , ( , | )t h t h
t t
D t d ( , |E t ) dτ ρ τ+ >∫ τ+∫ ρ τ . In Figure 4, it can easily be 
seen that for all [ ]0,1∈ρ , there exists [ ]max0,ρ ρ∈
1
 for which the condition for observational 
equivalence holds. Specifically, for θ = , 
 
 ( , | ) ( , | ) , 0.
t h t h
t t
D t d E t d tτ ρ τ τ ρ τ+ += ≥∫ ∫  (20) 
 
h exponential discounting
regular discounting Β0
1eh
10 Ρmax
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Ρ Ρ
Ρ, Ρ

t
th
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Figure 4. Observational equivalence of exponential and regular hyperbolic discounting under 
log-linear utility. 
 
It follows from Proposition 2 that under hyperbolic discounting, there always exists a constant 
discount rate – independent of calendar time – for which consumption and saving rate 
dynamics are equal to the ones in a model with exponential discounting. As a consequence, 
under the conditions of Proposition 2, a model with regular hyperbolic discounting does not 
exhibit a non-monotonic saving rate dynamics. This result is in stark contrast to Proposition 1 
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and Corollary 1, where it is shown that under full commitment and an infinite planning 
horizon, the saving rate dynamics may be non-monotonic – even with logarithmic utility.  
 
A special case of Proposition 2 refers to classical hyperbolic discounting ( 1β = ) and was 
previously discussed already by Findley and Caliendo (2011). 
 
Corollary 2. (Classical hyperbolic discounting) 
Consider a naïve household with a short planning horizon, h ++∈? , and with logarithmic 
utility, 1θ = . Then, classical hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent to 
exponential discounting. As a consequence, the saving rate follows a monotone transition 
path. 
 
As argued by Findley and Caliendo (2011), under the conditions of Corollary 2, short period 
planning perfectly offsets the effects of classical hyperbolic discounting.  
 
Proposition 2 does not capture that case of non-regular hyperbolic discount functions. 
Remember, following Groth et al. (2010), we call a hyperbolic discount function regular, if 
the second order growth rate of the discount rate is a constant multiple of the first-order 
growth rate. In contrast, we consider a hyperbolic discount function to be non-regular, if the 
second order growth rate of the discount function is a time-dependent multiple of the first-
order growth rate. That is, 
 
 ',t t t t t
t
ρ β ρ β βρ = − ≠
?
 for some . (21) , ' 0t t >
 
Corollary 3. Consider a naïve household with a short planning horizon, , and with 
logarithmic utility, 
h ++∈?
1θ = . Then, non-regular hyperbolic discounting is not observationally 
equivalent to exponential discounting. As a consequence, the saving rate may follow a non-
monotonic transition path. 
 
With a general path of tβ , (20) is not satisfied, as ( , | )t ht D t dτ ρ τ
+∫  depends on calendar time, 
while ( , | )
t h
t
E t dτ ρ τ+∫  does not. Therefore, with non-regular hyperbolic discounting, 
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according to (19), the propensity to consume out of total wealth is time-varying, and so is the 
saving rate.  
 
It is not that clear, though, whether or not the case of non-regular hyperbolic discounting – in 
a short planning horizon framework – is a natural case. In a model with cohorts, however, one 
may argue that tβ  differs among, say, younger and older households. 
 
Proposition 3. Consider a naïve household with a short planning horizon,  and with h ++∈?
1θ ≠ . If the rate of interest is not constant over time, no regular or non-regular hyperbolic 
discounting function allows for observational equivalence with exponential discounting. As a 
consequence, the saving rate may18 follow a non-monotonic transition path. 
 
Proof.  With a constant rate of interest, considering (19), an equivalence condition similar to 
(20) can be formulated, namely: 
 
 1/ 1/( , ) ( , ) , 0
t h t h
t t
D t d E t d tθ θτ τ τ τ+ += ≥∫ ∫ . 
 
This condition can be satisfied for regular discount functions. Once the rate of interest 
becomes time-dependent, however, the corresponding equivalence, 
 
 
1 1 1 1( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
R t R tt h t h
t t
D t e d E t e d
θ θτ τθ θ θ θτ τ τ
− −+ +=∫ ∫ τ  , (22) 
 
is not generally satisfied for all . Both the left hand side and the right hand side integrals 
become time-dependent. As, over the planning horizon, different profiles 
0t ≥
1/( , )D t θτ  and 
1/( , )E t θτ  are multiplied by the same time-dependent factor 
1 ( , )R t
e
θ τθ
−
, (22) is generally not 
satisfied for all . || t
 
                                                 
18 For specific parameter constellations, the saving rate may still follow a monotone transition path. Therefore we 
are careful to state “…the saving rate may follow…”. 
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To summarize, with full commitment, hyperbolic discounting always leads to the possibility 
of a non-monotonic saving rate dynamics. This result does not generally carry over to a model 
of naïve consumers with a short planning horizon. In the latter case, regular discounting with 
logarithmic utility or with a constant rate of interest rules out the case of a non-monotonic 
saving rate dynamics – due to observational equivalence. 
 
4.2 No commitment and Nash equilibrium 
 
In this section, we focus on a Nash equilibrium involving a sophisticated representative 
consumer. Each date- t -self decides how much to consume and how much to save so that 
neither the present nor any future self will have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium 
path. We employ the perturbation method developed in Barro (1999). We consider the same 
setup and utility integral as with full commitment, above. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume a constant population, , 0n = 1tL = . In order to simplify notation, we employ three 
discount factors: ; ( , )
t
ττ ρΡ ≡ ∫ ( )t s ds ( , ) ( )tR t r sτ≡ ∫ d dss ( , ) ( )tt sττ λΛ ≡ ∫τ ; . For regular 
discounting, [ ]1( , lt ) n 1 ( )tτ β β+ ρ −τ−Ρ = , with 0lim ( , ) ( )t tβ τ ρ τ→ Ρ = − , and 
( , )( , ) tD t e ττ −Ρ= . 
 
 
1 1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , )1 1
1 1 1
t tt t tc c cU e dt e dt e dt
θ θ θτ ετ τ
τ τ τ τ εθ θ θ
− − −∞ + ∞−Ρ −Ρ −Ρ
+
− − −= = +− − −∫ ∫ ∫ 1 t τ . (23) 
 
For a small ε , we approximate19 
 
 
1 1
( , )1 1
1 1
ttc cU
θ θ
ττ
τ τ εε θ θ
− −∞ −Ρ
+
− −≈ +− −∫ e dt
                                                
. (24) 
 
Next, we consider the growth rate of (per capita) consumption: 
 
 
19 Between τ  and τ ε+ , we consider consumption constant, and the discount factor equal to one. Below, we are 
interested in the limit, as ε approaches zero. 
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 t t
t
c r
c
tλ
θ
−=? , (25) 
where we call tλ  the effective discount rate (to be calculated). Due to hyperbolic discounting, 
tλ  is generally different from the discount rate tρ . If tλ  varies over time, the transition path 
of the saving rate may exhibit a non-monotonic pattern. In contrast, if it turns out that tλ  is 
constant over time, then the transitional path of the saving rate follows a monotone pattern, 
and the model with hyperbolic discounting becomes observationally equivalent to a model 
without hyperbolic discounting. In the proceeding analysis, we follow Barro (1999) to derive 
tλ  in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  
 
Taking into account (25), we re-write (24) as: 
 
 
1 1( , ) ( , )1 1
( , )1 1
1 1
R t t
tc c eU e
θ θτ ε τ εθ θ θ θ ττ τ ε
τ τ εε θ θ
− −+ − Λ +− −∞ −Ρ+
+
− −≈ +− −∫ dt  . (26) 
 
At any τ , for a given path of tλ , consumption is chosen so as to maximize (26). The resulting 
optimality condition becomes 
 
 
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 0
R t t t te e
θ τ τ τ τθ θ
τ
− − Λ∞ Λ −Ρ⎡ ⎤ dt− =⎣ ⎦∫  , (27) 
 
where the derivation is given in the Appendix. We employ (27) to derive a more instructive 
(but still implicit) path of tλ  from the optimality condition (27). A quick look at the 
optimality condition shows that without hyperbolic discounting – ( , ) ( )t tτ ρ τΡ = −
t
 – for (27) 
to hold, the term in square brackets must be equal to zero, that is, λ λ ρ= = . This is the 
conventional case of the neoclassical standard model with exponential discounting.  
 
Differentiating (27) with respect to τ  (see Appendix) yields: 
 
 
[ ]1 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )( , ) ( , )
, ( , )
( , )
R t t tt t dt
t e
t dt
θ
.
τ τ ττ θτ
τ
ω τ τλ ω τ
ω τ
∞ − −Λ −Ρ
∞
′Ρ= ≡∫ ∫   (28) 
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 The effective discount rate turns out to be a weighted average of all future discount rates, 
( , )t τ′Ρ . As demonstrated in Barro (1999), the weights (t, )ω τ  reflect the sensitivity of cτ  with 
respect to a marginal increase in kτ ε+ . This result leads directly to 
 
Proposition 4. Consider the neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas production and 
hyperbolic discounting. Under no commitment, for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium,  
(i) observational equivalence occurs if and only if 1θ =  or tr r= ; 
(ii) the transition path of the saving rate may exhibit a non-monotonic pattern if 1θ ≠  and 
. tr r≠
 
Proof. Statement (i) of Proposition 4 states the conditions for observational equivalence. In 
this framework, by observational equivalence we mean a situation with a constant effective 
discount rate: tλ λ= . In this case, the standard neoclassical growth model – with a constant 
discount rate equal to ρ  – can perfectly mimic the model with hyperbolic discounting, with a 
constant λ  (probably different from ρ ). Under conditions (i), τλ  is independent of time, as 
( , )t τΡ  only depends on the difference ( )t τ− , but not on calendar time. Similarly, if 1θ ≠  
and , all discount factors in rτ r= (28) depend on the difference (t )τ− , but no discount factor 
depends on calendar time. Therefore, under conditions (i), τλ  is independent of time, and 
observational equivalence occurs. 
Statement (ii) presents necessary requirements for the saving rate to exhibit non-monotonic 
transition paths. The weights ( , )tω τ  depend on calendar time (not only on the difference 
(t )τ− ) if and only if both conditions in (ii) are met, in which case, τλ  is time-dependent. || 
 
Proposition 4 suggests several results. In the absence of commitment technologies, hyperbolic 
discounting does not necessarily lead to non-monotone transition paths of the saving rate. For 
example, if either the rate of interest is constant or the IES equals one, the Cournot-Nash 
effective discount rate is time-invariant. In this case, the transition path of the saving rate is 
monotone, in spite of hyperbolic discounting. 
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For the saving rate to exhibit a non-monotonic transition pattern, in addition to hyperbolic 
discounting, an IES different from one and a time-varying rate of interest are needed. Suppose 
1θ >  (as is empirically supported, cf. Footnote 7), then ( , )tω τ  declines with . As tr '( , )t τΡ  
also declines over time, the effective rate of time preference, tλ , declines over time. The fact 
that households effectively become more patient over time (discounting effect) gives rise to a 
non-monotonic transition path of the saving rate. 
 
To summarize, with full commitment, the effective discount rate is time dependent, and so the 
transition path of the saving rate may be non-monotonic. With no commitment, a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium implies a time-dependent effective discount rate only if utility is not log-
linear and the rate of interest is not stationary. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas technology exhibits – for a 
reasonable calibration – a monotonously declining transition path of the saving rate, as an 
economy develops. This property is counterfactual and therefore unappealing for the analysis 
of policy shocks on transitional dynamics of an economy.  
 
In this paper, we consider the question whether or not hyperbolic discounting adds enough 
flexibility to the otherwise standard growth model for the saving rate to exhibit non-
monotonic dynamics. The answer depends on the specific framework used as well as on 
whether or not commitment technologies are available. The answer is “yes” for the standard 
framework under full commitment. For the other two investigated frameworks – naïve 
consumers with short planning horizons, and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium – the answer is 
“yes”, unless utility is log-linear and the rate of interest is constant. In the latter case, 
hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent to exponential discounting and does not 
affect the transitional dynamics of the saving rate.  
 
We also present a functionally specified generalized discounting function (regular 
discounting) that nests many cases employed in the prior literature as special cases. By 
varying a single parameter, the uncountable collection of resulting discounting functions 
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includes the cases of no discounting, exponential discounting, and classical hyperbolic 
discounting.  
 
The prior literature shows that the saving rate exhibits a non-monotonic dynamics in a 
neoclassical growth model with CES technology. In our paper, we show that the introduction 
of hyperbolic discounting – by adding a discounting effect to the substitution- and income 
effects – is also able to explain a non-monotonic transition path of the saving rate, even in a 
framework with Cobb-Douglas production technology.  
 
Several questions are open for future research. The propositions provide necessary, not 
sufficient conditions for the saving rate to exhibit non-monotonic dynamics. As seen in the 
figures depicting the numerical simulations, there exist parameter constellations for which 
transitional paths are monotone, in spite of the absence of observational equivalence. One 
research task then is the derivation of necessary and sufficient conditions for the saving rate to 
exhibit non-monotonic transition paths. Another open research question refers to partial 
commitment. If we allow for the more appealing case of partial rather than full commitment 
in the standard framework of Section 3, will the saving rate still exhibit non-monotonic 
transitional behavior? Notwithstanding those open questions, we still hope to have shed some 
light on the impact of hyperbolic discounting on saving rate dynamics in the neoclassical 
growth model. 
 
6. Appendix 
 
A. Proposition 1.  
In the following, time indexes are suppressed, unless needed for clarity. Define , 
, 
ˆ / ( )k K AL=
ˆ ( ) / ( ) / ( )c cL AL C AL= = ˆ / ( )y Y AL= . Clearly, ˆ ˆ/ / /x z C Y c y= = . Considering the 
production function, kˆyˆ α= . Finally, ˆ ˆ1 /c y1 /s x z= − = − . We express the dynamic system 
in the two variables . Development is considered as the case in which  (thereby ( 1ˆ α−
1kˆ
), / zk x kˆ
α− ) increases over time. Consequently, we are interested in whether the saddle path 
( )1ˆx kz α−  increases or decreases in 1kˆ α− . In the former (latter) case, the saving rate decreases 
(increases) as an economy develops. In order to consider this relationship, we express the 
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dynamical system in the variables ( )1ˆ , /k x zα−  in a phase diagram. Consider first the 
developments of ( )/x z  and  over time: kˆ
 ( ) 1 1 1ˆ ˆ(k nα αα −+ − 1/ ˆ( ) ( / ) ) (1 )( ) ( / )td x z k x z k n x zdt αρ δ α γ− − −⎡ ⎤= − − − − − − +⎣ ⎦θ α δ , (29) 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( / )k x z kα α ˆ( )k ndk
dt
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γ δ− + += − . (30) 
Solve both differential equations at ( )/ /d x z dt 0 , and ˆ / 0dk dt =  for ( / )x z : =
 1( / )/ 0 (1 1/dt ˆ)d x z t
x k
z
αθ ψ −= = − , (31) +
1
/ 0
ˆ1 (
dt
α ˆ( ) )d k
x k n
z
γ δ−= = − + + , (32) 
where ( )tδ ρ γθt n γ δ⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
)
αθ
+ += − + .  ψ
In  space, 1ˆ( , /k x zα− ˆ( )/dt=0d k
x
z
 is downward sloping, as ( ) 0n γ δ+ + > . At the same time, 
( / )/ 0d x z dt=
x
z
 is upward (downward) sloping if 0tψ >  (if 0tψ < ). It can easily be verified that 
in  space, the stable arm has a positive (a negative) slope if 1ˆ( , / )k x zα− 0tψ >  (if 0tψ < ).20  
 
Consider the case of exponential discounting ( tρ ρ= ). If 0tψ >  (if 0tψ < ), as an economy 
develops, ( / )x z  monotonically increases (decreases), and the saving rate monotonically 
decreases (increases). Now, consider the case of hyperbolic discounting that introduces two 
complexities. First, tψ  is not constant over time, and its sign may switch from positive to 
negative. For this reason, ( / )x z  may rise for some period, followed by a decline, that is, the 
saving rate declines for some period and then increases towards its steady state (see Figure 
A1).  
                                                 
20 See Barro, Sala-i-Martin (2004), p.108. 
 
Figure A1. A decline followed by an increase of the saving rate 
 
Second, with 0tψ <?
( / )
, the stable arm changes its location from one date to another. That is, the 
movement of x z  in time not only depends on the slope of the stable arms, but also on their 
respective shifts over time. This presents a second reason for non-monotone behavior of the 
saving rate over time. Suppose, 0tψ >  – i.e., the slope of the stable time-t-arm is increasing – 
but the next date’s stable arm (with lower slope) intersects with the time-t-arm at a lower 
value of 1kˆ α−  (see Figure A2). Then, although the slope of the stable arms is positive, ( / )x z  
declines and the saving rates increase over time. This situation is depicted as a move from 
point A to point B in Figure A2. Furthermore, if 0tψ >  still holds in the steady state, then 
( / )x z  eventually increases towards its steady state. In such a situation, the saving rate first 
increases but starts to decrease towards its steady state level as of a specific date. || 
 
 
Figure A2. An increase followed by a decline of the saving rate 
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 B. Short-term planning 
B.1 Derivation of (19). 
The procedure follows Findley and Caliendo (2011). Considering (18), we set up the 
Hamiltonian: 
 
 ( )1 0 01 ( , ) , [ , ]1t t t t t t
cH D t t r k w c t t t
θ
μθ
− −
0 h= + + − ∈ +−  . 
 
The first order condition with respect to  yields: tc
1/ 1/
0( , )t tc D t t
θ θμ−= . As / ,t t trμ μ = −?   
 
 0
0
1 1 ( , ) 1/
0( , )
R t t
t tc e D t t
θθ θμ−=  . (33) 
 
Considering (33) in the equation of motion of  yields tk
 
 0
0
1 1 ( , ) 1/
0( , )
R t t
t t t t tk r k w e D t t
θθ θμ−− = −? , 
 
which can be solved as: 
 
0
0
0 0
0
1 1 ( , )( , ) 1/ ( , )
0( , )
R ttR t t R t
t t tt
k k e w e D t e d
τ θ τθ θτ μ τ τ−⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ . 
 
Considering the above equation at 0t t h= +  together with the terminal condition 0 0t hk + = , 
and solving for the costate variable yields: 
 
 
0
0
0
0
0
00
0
( , )
1/
1 ( , )1/
0( , )
t h R t
t t
t
R tt h
t
k w e d
D t e d
τ
τθ
θ τθ θ
τ
μ
τ τ
+ −
−
−+
+
= ∫
∫
 . (34) 
 
Considering (34) in (33) yields an expression for planned consumption as seen from : 0t
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 0
0
0 00
00
0
( , )
1 ( , ) 1/
0 01 ( , )1/
0
( | ) ( , )
( , )
t h R t
t R t tt
R tt h
t
k w e d
c t t e D t t
D t e d
τ
τ θθ
θ τθ θ
τ
τ τ
+ −
−+
+
= ∫
∫
 . 
 
The household follows this consumption plan only at 0t t= . So, we consider the envelope, by 
setting all . In the resulting expression, we then replace  by t , which directly yields 0t t= 0t
(19): 
 
( , )
1 1 ( , )
( , )
t h R t
t t
t
R tt h
t
k w e d
c
D t e d
τ
τ
θ τθ θ
τ
τ τ
+ −
−+
+= ∫
∫
 . 
 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2. 
(i) In the proof, we employ the following lemma. 
Lemma. Let a . Then .  ++∈? 1 (1 / 2)ae a a> + +
To show the Lemma, notice that both functions,  and 1 (ae 1 / 2)a a+ +  are strictly 
monotonically increasing in . For a 0a = , =1. To prove the lemma, we 
need to show that the slope of  exceeds the slope of 1 (
0 1 0( / 2)e = +
1a a
1 0+
ae / 2)+ +  for all . That is, 
 for all 
a∈ ++?
1ae > + a a ++∈? . Consider the difference ( )a 1e a− + . As (1 )e a⎡ ⎤ / 1a aa e∂ − +⎣ ⎦ ∂ = −
a
, 
the difference is strictly increasing in . That is,   increases more strongly in  than 
 does, which proves the lemma.  
a ae
1 (1a a+ + / 2)
(ii) With exponential discounting, ( , ) (1 ) /
t h h
t
E t d e ρτ τ ρ+ −= −∫ . Regular hyperbolic 
discounting, according to (17), leads to 
( 1 )/1 (1( | )
( 1
t h
t
hD t d
β)
)
β
β ρ
− +∫ β ρτ τ+ − + += − + . Both integrals 
only depend on the planning horizon, but they are independent of calendar time t .  
(iii) Both integrals have the same limit, as ρ  approaches zero: 
0lim ( , )
t h
t
D t dρ τ τ+→ =∫ 0lim ( , )t ht E t d hρ τ τ+→ =∫ . Both integrals decline in ρ .  
(iv) For any given 0ρ > , with 0β > , ( , | ) ( , | )t h t h
t t
D t d E t dτ ρ τ τ ρ τ+ +>∫ ∫
( , )D t d
. To show this 
inequality, first, we notice that 
t h
t
τ τ+∫  is strictly monotonically increasing in β . 
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Graphically, this is seen as the area above the discounting curves in Figure 2. We take a first-
order approximation about 0β =  to evaluate  
 
 
( )1 (1 / 2
( , | ) ( , | )
h h
t h
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t h
t t
dτ+ + e e h hD t E t d
ρ ρβ ρ ρτ ρ τ ρ τ ρ
− ⎡ ⎤− + +⎣ ⎦− ≈∫ ∫
h
 . 
 
By the Lemma, taking a ρ= , the right hand side is strictly positive for any given 0ρ > , 
showing that ( , ( , | )
t h t h
t t
D t E t d| ) dτ ρ τ τ ρ τ+∫+∫ >  in fact holds. Therefore the discounting 
curves can be drawn as depicted in Figure 4. 
(v) As a consequence, there exists ρ ρ<  for which ( , | ) ( , | )t h t h
t t
D t d E t dτ ρ τ τ ρ τ+ +=∫ ∫ . 
Observational equivalence follows immediately from considering (19). In spite of hyperbolic 
discounting, consumption and saving follow the same path as under exponential discounting. 
As a consequence, Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (2004, p.135 ff.) result applies, i.e., the 
dynamics of the saving rate always is monotonic. || 
 
C. Cournot-Nash: Derivation of conditions (27) and (28). 
Following Barro (1999), we first approximate 
 
 (1 )k k r w cτ ε τ τ τ τε ε ε+ ≈ + + − ,  (35) 
 
implying that k
c
τ ε
τ
ε+∂ ≈ −∂ . Next, we employ the intertemporal budget constraint 
 
 
( , )
( , )
,
,
R t
t
R t
t
c e dt k h
h w e dt
τ ε
τ ε τ ετ ε
τ ε
τ ε τ ε
∞ − +
+ ++
∞ − +
+ +
= +
≡ ∫
∫
  (36) 
 
where hτ  denotes the present (date-τ ) value of human capital. Taking the consumption 
growth rate (25) into account, we are able to re-express (36) as: 
 
 
1 1( , ) ( , )
( )
R t t
c e dt k h
θ τ ε τ εθ θτ ε ττ ε
τ ε
− + − Λ +∞
+ ++
≡Δ +
= +∫?????????? ε τ ε+ .  (37) 
 
From (37), we infer that 1( )c
k
τ ε
τ ε
τ ε −+
+
∂ = Δ +∂ . Next, consider 
1( )dc dc dk
dc dk dc
τ ε τ ε τ ε
τ τ ε τ
ε τ ε −+ + +
+
= ≈ − Δ + . The first-order condition of (26) with respect to cτ  yields: 
 
 
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )( )
R t t tc c e e d
θ θτ ε τ εθ θ τθ θτ τ ε τ ετ ε
− −+ − Λ +∞− − −Ρ
+ +− Δ + + =∫ 0t , 
 
where we divided by ε  and multiplied by ( )τ εΔ + . We next take the limit as ε  approaches 
zero, and divide by c θτ
− : 
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 0
R t t t te e
θ τ τ τ τθ θ
τ
− − Λ∞ Λ −Ρ⎡ ⎤ dt− =⎣ ⎦∫ , 
 
which corresponds to (27). || 
In order to derive (28), we note that (27) is identically true. Define 
1 1( , ) ( , )
( , )
R t t
t e
θ τ τθ θυ τ
− − Λ≡ , 
and 
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , )
R t t t
t e
θ θτ τ τθ θω τ
− −− Λ −Ρ≡ . Then (27) becomes ( , ) ( , )t dt t dt
τ τ
ω τ υ τ
∞ ∞
=∫ ∫ . Differentiating 
with respect to τ  yields: 
 
 
1 1 1 1'( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 1 ( , ) ,
r t t dt r t dt
r t dt
τ τ τ ττ τ
τ τ τ
θ θ θλ τ ω τ λ υ τθ θ θ θ
θ λ ω τθ θ
∞ ∞
∞
− − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡− + + Ρ = − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎦ ⎣
−⎡ ⎤= − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫
∫
⎤⎥⎦   
 
which, upon simplifying, becomes: 
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 [ ]
1 1'( , ) ( , ) ( , )
'( , ) ( , ) 0
'( , ) ( , )
. ||
( , )
t t dt t dt
t t dt
t t dt
t dt
τ ττ τ
ττ
τ
τ
τ
θ λ τ ω τ λ ω τθ θ
λ τ ω τ
τ ω τλ
ω τ
∞ ∞
∞
∞
∞
−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Ρ = ⇔⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
− + Ρ = ⇔
Ρ=
∫ ∫
∫
∫
∫
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